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NOTES
TINKER-ING WITH SPEECH CATEGORIES: SOLVING THE
OFF-CAMPUS STUDENT SPEECH PROBLEM WITH A
CATEGORICAL APPROACH AND A COMPREHENSIVE
FRAMEWORK
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INTRODUCTION
“You are a bad person and everybody hates you. Have a shitty rest
of your life. The world would be a better place without you.”1 Online
messages like this one, which prompted Megan Meier to kill herself
in 2006,2 are shockingly common among adolescent and teen
students.3 Over half have been bullied online, more than one-third
have been threatened online, and over fourteen percent have
considered or attempted suicide as a result.4 Off-campus student
speech, especially that which occurs online, has become a sharpened
tool for bullying,5 can cause severe and substantial disruptions of
the school environment,6 and can even foreshadow fatal incidents
both on and off campus.7 Yet currently no uniform standard for
regulating off-campus speech exists.8
Off-campus student speech has been a contested topic since the
Supreme Court held in Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District that on-campus student speech may be regulated if it might reasonably cause a substantial disruption of school
activities.9 Since then, lower courts have struggled to apply the
Tinker standard to speech that occurs off campus and, since the

1. Kate E. Schwartz, Note, Criminal Liability for Internet Culprits: The Need for Updated
State Laws Covering the Full Spectrum of Cyber Victimization, 87 WASH. U. L. REV. 407, 40708 (2009) (quoting a message sent by the mother of a student, posing as a teenage boy, in an
attempt to bully the recipient student).
2. Id.
3. See BULLYING STATISTICS, http://www.bullyingstatistics.org/content/cyber-bullyingstatistics.html (last visited Oct. 17, 2013).
4. See id.
5. See Nancy Willard, School Response to Cyberbullying and Sexting: The Legal
Challenges, 2011 BYU EDUC. & L.J. 75, 75 (“‘[C]yberbullying’ is the use of electronic
communication technologies to intentionally engage in repeated or widely disseminated cruel
acts towards another that results in emotional harm.”).
6. See discussion infra Part II.
7. See discussion infra Part II.B.
8. See, e.g., Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 401 (2007) (“There is some uncertainty ...
as to when courts should apply school speech precedents.”).
9. 393 U.S. 503, 514 (1969) (holding that schools may regulate on-campus speech that
could reasonably cause “substantial disruption of ... school activities”); see Sullivan v. Houston
Indep. Sch. Dist., 307 F. Supp. 1328, 1340-41 (S.D. Tex. 1969) (discussing the application of
Tinker to instances of off-campus student speech).
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advent of the Internet, online.10 The resulting decisions have led to
several variations on the Supreme Court’s standards.11 In determining whether the speech can be regulated, lower courts have
considered factors such as foreseeability of a substantial school
disruption,12 foreseeability that the speech would reach campus,13
the actual place of the speech’s reception,14 and the intent of the
speaker.15
Likewise, legal scholars and law students have suggested myriad
tests for determining if off-campus student speech can be regulated.
These tests include abandonment of the Tinker test in off-campus
speech cases,16 application of the Tinker test with additional
restrictions,17 various methods of determining the speaker’s
intended place of dissemination,18 and frameworks for determining
what types of off-campus speech may be regulated under restrictions
for on-campus speech.19
To clarify the disparate case law and academic proposals, this
Note will argue for a comprehensive framework that takes a new
approach to student speech—the categorical approach. To date, few
10. See, e.g., J.S. ex rel. Snyder v. Blue Mountain Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 915, 940 (3d Cir.
2011), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 1097 (2012); Layshock ex rel. Layshock v. Hermitage Sch. Dist.,
650 F.3d 205, 220-22 (3d Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 1097 (2012); Kowalski v. Berkeley
Cnty. Sch., 652 F.3d 565, 572-73 (4th Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 1097 (2012); Beussink
v. Woodland R-IV Sch. Dist., 30 F. Supp. 2d 1175, 1180 (E.D. Mo. 1998).
11. See, e.g., Kowalski, 652 F.3d at 567; Wisniewski ex rel. Wisniewski v. Bd. of Ed. of the
Weedsport Cent. Sch. Dist., 494 F.3d 34 (2d Cir. 2007); J.S. ex rel. H.S. v. Bethlehem Area
Sch. Dist., 807 A.2d 847, 865 (Pa. 2002).
12. Wisniewski, 494 F.3d at 39.
13. Id.
14. Boucher v. Sch. Bd. of Greenfield, 134 F.3d 821, 829 (7th Cir. 1998).
15. Kowalski, 652 F.3d at 567.
16. See Kenneth R. Pike, Comment, Locating the Mislaid Gate: Revitalizing Tinker by
Repairing Judicial Overgeneralizations of Technologically Enabled Student Speech, 2008
BYU L. REV. 971, 974.
17. See Tracy Adamovich, Note, Return to Sender: Off-Campus Student Speech Brought
On-Campus by Another Student, 82 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 1087, 1090 (2008); James Patrick,
Comment, The Civility-Police: The Rising Need to Balance Students’ Rights to Off-Campus
Internet Speech Against the School’s Compelling Interests, 79 U. CIN. L. REV. 855, 857 (2010).
18. See Clay Calvert, Off-Campus Speech, On-Campus Punishment: Censorship of the
Emerging Internet Underground, 7 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 243, 251-52 (2001); Adamovich,
supra note 17, at 1090; Patrick, supra note 17, at 857; Pike, supra note 16, at 974; Alexander
G. Tuneski, Note, Online, Not on Grounds: Protecting Student Internet Speech, 89 VA. L. REV.
139, 140 (2003).
19. See Patrick, supra note 17, at 857.
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scholars have proposed solutions that comprehensively address both
on- and off-campus speech, and none have taken the categorical
approach advocated here. The proposed framework will regulate
student speech according to which of the following categories it falls
into: on-campus speech, threatening off-campus speech, nonthreatening off-campus speech about other students, and nonthreatening
off-campus speech about teachers or administrators.20
Under the proposed framework, student speech will be considered
on-campus if: (1) it actually takes place on campus; (2) it advocates
on-campus action; or (3) a reasonable person would believe, given
the circumstances, that the student intended for his speech to reach
the school.21 If student speech is deemed on-campus, it will be
subject to the Tinker standard and therefore subject to regulation if
the speech might reasonably cause substantial disruption of school
activities.22
Speech that does not meet the above standard will be considered
off-campus under the proposed framework. Threatening off-campus
speech will be subject to regulation if it could reasonably foreshadow violence. Nonthreatening off-campus speech about other
students will be subject to regulation if a reasonable person would
expect it to cause a substantial disruption of the targeted students’
school activities. Nonthreatening off-campus speech about teachers
and administrators will be protected from regulation unless it is
about a coach or other leader of a voluntary student activity.
This framework is based on the principle that student speech
generally receives less constitutional protection than citizen speech
in other contexts.23 Following from that principle, and from the
regular damage caused by cyberbullying and similar speech, student
speech about other students should receive less First Amendment
protection than student speech about teachers and administrators.
20. For the purpose of this Note, the proposed framework will apply only to public school
students from elementary school through high school.
21. See Patrick, supra note 17, at 888. This prong has the benefit of incorporating the
evolving standard of reasonableness as mobile Internet access becomes increasingly
ubiquitous.
22. See Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 514 (1969).
23. See Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 487 U.S. 675, 682 (1986) (“[T]he constitutional
rights of students in school are not automatically coextensive with the rights of adults in other
settings.”).
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Though courts have not explicitly classified off-campus speech based
on the party it impacts, one scholar suggests that courts have been
doing so implicitly all along.24
Part I of this Note will review the current state of student speech
law and proposed approaches to the problem. This will include a
review of the four Supreme Court decisions that have addressed
student speech, followed by a review of the commentary addressing
the on-/off-campus dichotomy, the content and effects of the speech,
and the need for an easy-to-apply standard. Part II will give context
to this Note’s proposed framework and show how it would apply
through a review of lower court student speech cases. This analysis
will also demonstrate the potential value of nonthreatening student
speech about teachers and administrators and suggest a unifying
principle for the seemingly disparate lower court case law. Finally,
Part III will discuss some of the most formidable potential criticisms
of the proposed framework and how they can be addressed.
By adopting this Note’s proposed changes to student speech law,
courts can promote clarity, consistency, and a better academic
environment for all.
I. CURRENT LAW AND PROPOSED SOLUTIONS
In order to appreciate the off-campus student speech problem, an
understanding of the foundational case law and the existing
scholarship is necessary. This Part will briefly review the Supreme
Court case law on student speech and more thoroughly analyze the
present state of academic proposals to the off-campus student
speech problem. With that background, Part II will move forward
with the proposed framework and its application to lower court
cases.

24. Willard, supra note 5, at 95 (“Thus far, no court has upheld the discipline of a student
where the only disruption ... has been directed at a school staff member.”).
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A. Supreme Court Student Speech Cases
1. Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District
In its seminal student speech case, the Supreme Court articulated
the rule that would define the contours of over forty years of debate.
On the question of whether students could wear black armbands in
school to protest the Vietnam war, the Court held that schools may
regulate on-campus speech if that speech might reasonably cause
“substantial disruption of ... school activities.”25 The Court did not
explicitly address the question of off-campus student speech, but
implied that off-campus speech was fully protected under the First
Amendment with the pronouncement that “[i]t can hardly be argued
that ... students ... shed their constitutional rights to freedom of
speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate.”26 This foundational
precedent has never been overruled, and it has become the bedrock
of student speech law in the United States.27
2. Bethel School District No. 403 v. Fraser
The second Supreme Court case to address student speech, Bethel
School District No. 403 v. Fraser, upheld punishment for a student’s
“lewd and indecent” speech.28 This case established three essential
points for the present discussion. First, the punishable speech was
“unrelated to any political viewpoint;”29 second, the speech was
punishable because of its content;30 and third, the Court affirmed
25. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 514. The court held that the challenged armbands did not
constitute such a disruption. Id.
26. Id. at 506.
27. See, e.g., cases cited infra Part II.B-E.
28. 478 U.S. at 676. The student addressed the punished speech to approximately six
hundred high school students, age fourteen and older, and in it described a classmate in an
“elaborate, graphic, and explicit sexual metaphor.” Id. at 677-78.
29. Id. at 685.
30. Id. As “lewd and indecent,” Fraser’s speech was necessarily regulatable because of the
category it fell into. Id. at 676. One could infer after this holding that all “lewd and indecent”
speech is subject to administrative regulation. See id. at 685 (“The First Amendment does not
prevent the school officials from determining that to permit a vulgar and lewd speech ... would
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that “the constitutional rights of students in public school are not
automatically coextensive with the rights of adults in other settings.”31 Thus, the Court held that in some instances, regulation of
student speech because of its content is permissible.32
3. Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier
Two years later, the Supreme Court decided Hazelwood School
District v. Kuhlmeier.33 The Court held that a high school newspaper
did not constitute a public forum, and as a result, in some situations
school officials could regulate its content.34 The Court also made an
important distinction: individual student expression is entitled to
greater protection than speech that could be construed as subsidized
by the school.35
4. Morse v. Frederick
Most recently, the Supreme Court revisited this issue in the
context of speech at a school-sponsored event.36 On a field trip,
Joseph Frederick unfurled a banner that his principal, Deborah
Morse, believed was advocating illegal drug use.37 Consistent with
school policy, Morse confiscated Frederick’s banner and suspended
him—a punishment the Court upheld as constitutional.38 Two
undermine the school’s basic educational mission.”).
31. Id. at 682.
32. Id. at 685.
33. 484 U.S. 260 (1988). In Kuhlmeier, a school principal removed two proposed student
newspaper articles, one addressing student pregnancy and one addressing the impact of
divorce on students, to protect the identities and privacy of the people described in them. Id.
at 263-64.
34. See id. at 270-71. The Court found that the school board’s policy ensuring that articles
were “developed within the adopted curriculum and its educational implications” implied that
school officials retained control over final publication decisions. Id. at 269.
35. Id. at 271. This distinction will be essential to the proposed framework’s narrow
exception for student speech about certain administrators, as discussed infra Part II.E.1.
36. Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 396 (2007). The school principal had invited staff
and students to watch the Olympic Torch Relay as it passed in front of Frederick’s high
school. Id. at 397.
37. Id. at 396. The now-infamous banner was fourteen feet long, and bore the phrase
“BONG HiTS 4 JESUS” in large, easily readable letters. Id. at 397.
38. Id. at 397 (“[W]e hold that schools may take steps to safeguard those entrusted to their
care from speech that can reasonably be regarded as encouraging illegal drug use.... [T]he
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important points come from this case. First, the Court upheld
regulation of speech that was not strictly on-campus.39 Second, as in
Fraser, the Court upheld the regulation of speech because it fell into
a specific category: here, it was speech “promoting illegal drug
use.”40
The foregoing cases give several clues to the direction and limits
of future student speech decisions. Tinker provided the background
rule to which all subsequent decisions conform.41 Fraser expanded
Tinker by adding a categorical exception for lewd speech and
reaffirmed that student speech, particularly nonpolitical speech, is
subject to less protection than nonstudent speech in other contexts.42
Kuhlmeier limited Tinker to unsubsidized student expression and
clarified that schools have greater control over school-sponsored
student expression that might “reasonably [be] perceive[d] to bear
the imprimatur of the school.”43 Finally, Morse v. Frederick slightly
expanded the reach of Tinker to include off-campus speech at schoolsponsored events, and reaffirmed the Court’s willingness to restrict
certain categories of student speech.44 These cases frame the
following discussion and form the basis of this Note’s proposed
framework.
B. Academic Proposals
Commentators have offered myriad suggestions for solving the offcampus student speech problem. Given the present state of Supreme
Court case law, most commentators focus on whether speech can be
considered on- or off-campus before addressing the question of

school officials in this case did not violate the First Amendment by confiscating the pro-drug
banner and suspending the student responsible for it.”).
39. Id. at 400-01 (holding that, although Frederick was across the street from the school
at the time, he could not “stand in the midst of his fellow students, during school hours, at a
school-sanctioned activity and claim he [was] not at school.”).
40. Id. at 400.
41. Schools may regulate on-campus speech only if that speech might reasonably cause
“substantial disruption of ... school activities.” Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist.,
393 U.S. 503, 514 (1969).
42. See discussion supra Part I.A.2.
43. Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 270-71 (1988).
44. See supra Part I.A.4.
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regulation.45 Although there are a variety of different models for
distinguishing on- from off-campus student speech, most focus on
the intent of the student speaker at the time of the speech.46
After answering the on-/off-campus question, one subset of
commentators suggests that a student’s speech should not be subject
to regulation if it occurred off campus.47 Others suggest that offcampus speech should be regulated, subject to certain restrictions.48
Yet another group of commentators proposes that the content of the
speech alone, regardless of its on- or off-campus designation, should
determine whether it can be regulated.49 This subset deals mainly
with speech that impedes learning.50 Finally, one commentator even
argues that off-campus student speech should be regulated through
a personal jurisdiction framework.51 The difficulty for school
administrators to apply such a model proves the need for the clear,
easy-to-apply standard for which this Note advocates.
Though a survey of every regulatory model is beyond the scope of
this Note, this Part will highlight some of the most promising
attributes of the selected frameworks and point out the key
weaknesses that have prevented them from being adopted by courts.
Each of the following sections will address one of the aforementioned subsets of proposals, and the proposed framework to follow
will incorporate the best elements of each. Research indicates that
the ideal standard will have three essential elements: (1) a workable
model for distinguishing on- from off-campus speech; (2) a clear
framework for distinguishing between protected and unprotected
off-campus speech; and (3) the simplicity to be applied by busy
school administrators “who lack legal training.”52
45. See, e.g., Patrick, supra note 17, at 857.
46. See, e.g., Calvert, supra note 18, at 251-52; Adamovich, supra note 17, at 1090; Pike,
supra note 16, at 974; Tuneski, supra note 18, at 140.
47. See, e.g., Calvert, supra note 18, at 251-52; Tuneski, supra note 18, at 140.
48. See, e.g., Adamovich, supra note 17, at 1090; Patrick, supra note 17, at 857.
49. See, e.g., Martha McCarthy, Student Expression that Collides with the Rights of
Others: Should the Second Prong of Tinker Stand Alone?, 240 EDUC. L. REP. 1, 15 (2009).
50. See, e.g., id. at 1-2.
51. See Kyle W. Brenton, Note, BONGHITS4JESUS.COM? Scrutinizing Public School
Authority over Student Cyberspeech Through the Lens of Personal Jurisdiction, 92 MINN. L.
REV. 1206, 1230-44 (2008).
52. Pike, supra note 16, at 1005-06; see also Benjamin L. Ellison, Note, More Connection,
Less Protection? Off-Campus Speech with On-Campus Impact, 85 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 809,
833 (2010).
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1. The On-/Off- Dichotomy
As noted above, any standard that addresses off-campus student
speech must comport with current Supreme Court case law. As the
law currently stands, on-campus student speech may be regulated
if it might reasonably cause a “substantial disruption of ... school
activities.”53 Therefore, most analyses focus primarily on whether
the contested speech can be considered on-campus.
a. Objective Intent of the Speaker
Perhaps the most promising framework for making this designation comes from commentator James Patrick, who proposes that
schools may regulate student speech as if it took place on campus if
“a reasonable person would believe, given the circumstances
surrounding the student’s speech, including the mode of technology
used and any steps taken to ensure the privacy of the speech, that
the student intended to guarantee his speech reached the school.”54
This objective test is appealing because of its simplicity. It does
not require a court or administrator to guess a student’s subjective
intent, but only requires that a reasonable person—the principal,
perhaps—would believe “that the student [meant] to guarantee
[that] his [message] reached the school.”55 This is a substantial, but
not insurmountable, burden. At the same time, this framework
incorporates a theoretically infinite number of proposed factors into
the analysis. For example, another standard analyzes online profiles
according to whether they are public or private.56 Under Patrick’s
standard, the privacy setting of a profile would be one of a number
of factors the reasonable person would consider.57 A decision to post

53. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 514 (1969).
54. Patrick, supra note 17, at 888 (footnotes omitted); see also Philip T.K. Daniel & Scott
Greytak, A Need to Sharpen the First Amendment Contours of Off-Campus Student Speech,
273 EDUC. L. REP. 21, 42 (2011) (examining Patrick’s proposal).
55. Patrick, supra note 17, at 888 (emphasis added).
56. Kara D. Williams, Comment, Public Schools vs. MySpace and Facebook: The Newest
Challenge to Student Speech Rights, 76 U. CIN. L. REV. 707, 709, 726 (2008).
57. Patrick, supra note 17 at 888; see also Williams, supra note 56, at 726.
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privately would impact the question of whether the student
intended to guarantee that his speech reached the school.
Unfortunately, Patrick’s approach to regulation of off-campus
speech is less appealing. If speech is deemed off-campus, Patrick
suggests that schools may regulate it only if they can articulate a
compelling state interest to do so or if the speech “falls outside the
protection of the First Amendment.”58 This calculus has the benefit
of being comprehensive, but it has the drawback of forcing administrators to act as constitutional law scholars. School administrators
rarely have the time, resources, or knowledge to make such
determinations, which suggests that this element of Patrick’s
framework has little practical value.
b. Additional Intent-Based Approaches
Professor Clay Calvert suggests considering all online speech that
originates off campus as off-campus speech.59 School officials should
not regulate such speech unless the student speaker, or another
student, downloaded his online speech onto a school computer.60
Similarly, commentator Alexander Tuneski proposes that speech be
regulatable only if students “take additional steps to bring the
material to [the] school campus”—a proxy for speaker intent.61
Another author, Kenneth Pike, suggests a novel concept for the
familiar framework with a test that distinguishes “active versus
passive telepresence.”62 Pike asks whether the off-campus communication was intended for simultaneous on-campus consumption,
like a phone call from home to school.63 However, when applied to
online postings, the question becomes the same as others: whether
the student intended his online posting to be accessed at the
school.64 Finally, for off-campus speech to be regulated, Benjamin
58. Patrick, supra note 17, at 888-89.
59. See Calvert, supra note 18, at 252-53.
60. See id.
61. See Tuneski, supra note 18, at 177-78; see also Daniel & Greytak, supra note 54, at 25,
40 n.173 (evaluating the practicality of Tuneski’s position).
62. Pike, supra note 16, at 1001 (cited in Doninger v. Niehoff, 594 F. Supp. 2d 211, 224
(D. Conn. 2009), rev’d, 642 F.3d 334 (2d Cir. 2011)).
63. Id. at 1002.
64. Id. at 1004-05.
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Ellison requires that: (1) the student intend for the speech to reach
the school; (2) the speech actually reach the school; and (3) the
speech fall into a category less protected than First Amendment
speech.65
These commentators each rely on the intent of the speaker to
answer the on-/off-campus question, but, like Patrick, they do not
adequately distinguish regulatable from protected off-campus
speech after doing so.
c. Scope of a Student
In another variation on the theme, commentator Erin Reeves
proposes a but-for test to establish the on-campus connection.66 In
Reeves’s test, if the speech would not have occurred but for the
speaker’s status as a student, then the speech is considered oncampus.67 If the speech would have occurred regardless of the
speaker’s status as a student, it is considered off-campus, and the
school must show that the speech was of such low value that it did
not warrant First Amendment protection.68 For example, off-campus
expression of disagreement with United States foreign policy—similar to the speech in Tinker—would pass the but-for test
and would have sufficient value to be deemed protected. Off-campus
expression of disagreement with school parking policy, however,
would not. This standard, though novel, fails to provide a practical
limiting principle for distinguishing on- from off-campus speech.
The but-for test does not prevent administrative censorship and
viewpoint discrimination because virtually anything administrators
would wish to regulate will fail that test.
Many of these analyses look at similar variables to determine the
speaker’s intent, and most agree that an objective test is
necessary.69 Where many analyses fall short is in their limited
treatment of speech deemed off-campus. Indeed, none of these
65. Ellison, supra note 52, at 842-43; see also Daniel & Greytak, supra note 54, at 40 n.173
(describing Ellison’s proposal as “courageous”).
66. Erin Reeves, Note, The “Scope of a Student”: How to Analyze Student Speech in the Age
of the Internet, 42 GA. L. REV. 1127, 1157-58 (2008) (cited in Doninger, 594 F. Supp. 2d at 223).
67. Id.
68. Id. at 1158.
69. See discussion supra Part I.B.1.
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commentators propose any regulation for such speech beyond what
is already permissible under the First Amendment.70 The next
subset of proposals addresses this secondary question more
thoroughly.
2. Regulatable vs. Protected Off-Campus Speech
In a departure from the on-/off-campus analysis, some scholars
advocate for the regulation of student speech based solely on its
content and effects.71 These analyses deal with the impact of the
speech on a student’s ability to learn, particularly in the context of
cyberbullying.72 They provide a clear rationale for restricting certain
kinds of student speech and factor heavily into this Note’s proposed
framework.
a. Speech that Interferes with the Rights of Others
In her commentary on “the second prong of Tinker,” Professor
Martha McCarthy bases a line of reasoning on the final clause of
Tinker’s holding.73 The court held that a student “may express his
opinions ... if he does so without ‘materially and substantially
interfer[ing] with the requirements of appropriate discipline in the
operation of the school’ and without colliding with the rights of
others.”74 This second prong supports McCarthy’s assertion that
Tinker protects students from off-campus harassment, regardless of
whether that harassment caused an on-campus disruption.75 In
sum, Tinker provides the authority for courts to prevent students’
educational rights from being “impaired because of degrading and

70. See id.
71. See, e.g., McCarthy, supra note 49, at 1-2.
72. See id. at 12; Willard, supra note 5, at 75.
73. McCarthy, supra note 49, at 13.
74. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 513 (1969) (emphasis
added) (quoting Burnside v. Byars, 363 F.2d 744, 749 (5th Cir. 1966)) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
75. McCarthy, supra note 49, at 13 (“The second prong of Tinker provides a justification
for curtailing expression that violates antiharassment policies even though not linked to a
disruption.”).
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intimidating comments from classmates delivered in person or
electronically.”76
b. Speech that Impedes Learning
In a thorough analysis focused on bullying and cyberbullying,
practitioner Nancy Willard suggests that off-campus speech may be
regulated “only when [its] impact ... has or could come back through
that ‘schoolhouse gate’ and significantly interfere with the rights of
other students.”77 Willard points to lower court cases addressing offcampus student speech, noting that “courts have always focused on
the potential impact on students.”78 This supports the idea that
students alone—not teachers or administrators—should be protected from the adverse effects of off-campus speech. Indeed,
according to Willard, “Thus far, no court has upheld the discipline
of a student where the only disruption ... has been directed at a
school staff member.”79
Together, McCarthy and Willard support the proposition that the
only permissible goal of regulating off-campus student speech is to
protect every student’s educational opportunities. That proposition
forms the foundation for this Note’s framework: if student education
is more important than certain forms of student speech, then those
forms of student speech must not be allowed to interfere with
student education.
Though this policy consideration adds to the analysis, McCarthy
and Willard alone do not solve the off-campus student speech
problem because they do not reliably distinguish on- from offcampus speech. A more comprehensive answer is needed.

76. Id. at 15.
77. Willard, supra note 5, at 91. Willard is the Director of the Center for Safe and
Responsible Internet Use.
78. Id. at 95.
79. Id. The meaning of Willard’s statement is slightly unclear. Several courts, both before
and after Willard’s article was published, punished students for off-campus Internet speech
directed at faculty and administration. See discussion infra Part II.D-E. For present purposes,
this quote is used to support the proposition that off-campus speech that only disrupts school
staff should be protected from regulation.
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3. Highlighting the Need for Simplicity
Finally, with a standard that seeks to streamline the analysis,
commentator Kyle Brenton proposes a truly novel approach to the
off-campus question. Brenton proposes that, before addressing the
intent, content, and effect of student speech, a school should answer
the threshold question of whether the speech has such minimum
contacts with the school that its regulation would not offend
“notions of fair play and substantial justice.”80 This hallmark of
personal jurisdiction has utility for a court determining after the
fact whether a particular student’s speech is regulatable. It is
extremely difficult for anyone without legal training to apply,
however, and thus provides little guidance for the untrained
students, parents, teachers, and administrators whom it would
affect.
4. Combining Key Elements
The commentary above provides structure for this Note’s proposed
framework. Patrick’s objective intent standard, which asks whether
a reasonable person would think that the student intended to
guarantee that his speech reached school, forms the backbone of the
on- or off-campus distinction. McCarthy and Willard’s focus on the
rights and educational opportunities of students provides the basis
for the second prong, which distinguishes protected off-campus
speech from regulatable off-campus speech. And Brenton’s personal
jurisdiction framework highlights the need for simplicity in the busy
lives of students, parents, teachers, and administrators.
Though each proposal contributes importantly to this Note’s
framework, each lacks the comprehensiveness, simplicity, or
applicability to solve the off-campus student speech problem on its
own. The next Part will show how the proposed framework combines
80. See Brenton, supra note 51, at 1234-40 (cited in Doninger v. Nieoff, 594 F. Supp. 2d
211, 224 (D. Conn. 2009), rev’d, 642 F.3d 334 (2d Cir. 2011)); see also Int’l Shoe Co. v.
Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (“[I]n order to subject a defendant to a judgment in
personam ... he [must] have certain minimum contacts ... such that the maintenance of the
suit does not offend ‘traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.’”) (quoting
Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940)).
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the best elements of each proposal with additional nuances to
provide a comprehensive solution to the off-campus student speech
problem.
II. LOWER COURT CASES AND PROPOSED FRAMEWORK
First, this Part will describe this Note’s proposed framework for
regulating off-campus student speech. Next, this Part will show
how the framework would apply to the types of speech it addresses:
(1) speech that is deemed on-campus; (2) threatening speech that is
deemed off-campus; (3) nonthreatening off-campus speech about
other students; and (4) nonthreatening off-campus speech about
teachers and administrators. For each type of speech the framework
addresses, this Part will review the pertinent case law and discuss
how the framework would apply in each case.
A. Proposed Framework
The proposed framework adopts Patrick’s objective intent test to
determine whether speech is on- or off-campus.81 Included in the oncampus category is all speech that advocates on-campus activity,82
notwithstanding that a reasonable person may believe that the
student speaker did not intend for his actual speech to reach the
campus.83 If the speech is deemed on-campus, Tinker and related
81. See supra note 54 and accompanying text.
82. This category includes advocating for communication with school administrators, as
in Doninger v. Niehoff, 642 F.3d 334 (2d Cir. 2011), discussed infra notes 158-63 and
accompanying text.
83. This distinction comes from Boucher v. Sch. Bd. of Greenfield, 134 F.3d 821, 828 (7th
Cir. 1998) (“[The contested speech] is a call to action detrimental to the tangible interests of
the school.”). See discussion infra Part II.E.3 for application and further explanation. Outside the school context, this distinction is of questionable validity. See Brandenburg v. Ohio,
395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (“[T]he constitutional guarantees of free speech ... do not permit a
State to forbid ... advocacy of ... law violation except where such advocacy is directed to
inciting ... imminent lawless action and is likely to incite ... such action.”). However, “the
Court has repeatedly emphasized the ... comprehensive authority of the States and of school
officials, consistent with fundamental constitutional safeguards, to prescribe and control
conduct in the schools.” Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 507
(1969). As held in Kuhlmeier, the First Amendment rights of students in public schools “are
not automatically coextensive with the rights of adults in other settings.” 484 U.S. 260, 266
(1988) (quoting Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 682 (1986) (internal
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cases control.84 But if the speech is deemed off-campus, whether it
can be regulated will depend on the speech’s type.
Bearing in mind the grant of administrative responsibility and
authority to prevent violence in school,85 under this Note’s framework, all threatening speech that could reasonably foreshadow
violence can be regulated at the discretion of school administrators.86 Such a rule gives administrators the authority to regulate
speech that could lead to violence without granting overbroad
plenary power to censor all harshly worded speech.
With regard to speech that is not likely to lead to violence, this
Note’s adopted framework applies a modified Tinker test to offcampus student speech about other students. Specifically, offcampus student speech about other students can be regulated if a
reasonable person would expect it to cause a substantial disruption
of targeted students’ school activities. This test is broad enough to
protect individual students from speech that would not otherwise
disrupt the entire school, but narrow enough to prevent administrators from punishing or regulating without cause.
Finally, to protect and promote discourse about matters of public
concern, nonthreatening off-campus speech about teachers and
administrators will have normal First Amendment protection.87 This
also serves as a “safety valve” function by protecting student
“venting” about teachers and administrators as long as it does not

quotation marks omitted). Thus, the distinction is valid within the school context. Id.
84. See supra Part I.A.
85. See, e.g., Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 425 (2007) (Alito, J., concurring) (“[S]chool
officials must have greater authority to intervene before speech leads to violence.”); New
Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 350 (1985) (Powell, J., concurring) (“Without first establishing
discipline and maintaining order, teachers cannot begin to educate their students.... [T]he
school has the obligation to protect pupils from mistreatment by other children, and also to
protect teachers themselves from violence.”); J.S. ex rel. H.S. v. Bethlehem Area Sch. Dist.,
807 A.2d 847, 860 (Pa. 2002) (“[S]chool officials are justified ... in taking student threats
against faculty or other students seriously.”).
86. See, e.g., Todd D. Erb, A Case for Strengthening School District Jurisdiction to Punish
Off-Campus Incidents of Cyberbullying, 40 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 257, 260, 267, 276 (2008) (arguing
that “the legal system [must] expand school district authority to punish cyberbullying
incidents” because “[t]hreats of harm or violence constitute a good portion of [those] incidents”
and the laws currently in place “do not help school children combat the ... problem”).
87. This enforcement gap is best addressed by judicial remedies, like defamation and libel.
For a discussion of legal remedies beyond the school context, see infra Part III.D and Erb,
supra note 86, at 277.
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cross the line into foreshadowing violence.88 Allowing students to
vent frustrations about the teachers and administrators who
discipline them may make them less likely to have violent outbursts
on campus.89 For reasons discussed below, and consistent with
Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier, this protection will not
extend to speech about coaches and other leaders of voluntary
student activities.90
As the cases below demonstrate, courts already seem to be
applying the components of this test, even if they are not explicitly
saying so.91
B. Threatening Speech
Under this Note’s framework, all threatening speech that could
reasonably foreshadow violence can be regulated at the discretion
of school administrators. Unsurprisingly, courts have been extremely reluctant to restrict administrative action taken in response
to threatening speech, either on- or off-campus, regardless of its
object.92 Commentators have attempted to shoehorn threatening
speech into a larger category of unprotected student speech,93 but
this Note proposes that it is best regulated as a category unto itself.
Whereas virtually every other category of student speech impinges
an intangible—if very real—attribute of a student, teacher, or
administrator, threatening speech could foreshadow death or bodily
harm and therefore requires close monitoring and a quick response.
88. See Calvert, supra note 18, at 282 (“That teenagers feel frustrated with ... their schools
is not a new phenomenon. The Internet, however, provides a new medium on which students
can express their frustrations and feelings. [One student] was using this medium as a passive
outlet ... for his anger and rage. We should be thankful that he was using speech and not a
gun to express his emotions.”).
89. See id.
90. 484 U.S. 260, 271 (1988); see also discussion infra Part II.E.1.
91. See discussion infra Part II.A-E.
92. See, e.g., Wisniewski ex rel. Wisniewski v. Bd. of Ed. of the Weedsport Cent. Sch. Dist.,
494 F.3d 34, 39-40 (2d Cir. 2007); LaVine v. Blaine Sch. Dist., 257 F.3d 981, 983 (9th Cir.
2001); J.S. ex rel. H.S. v. Bethlehem Area Sch. Dist., 807 A.2d 847, 850 (Pa. 2002).
93. See Patrick, supra note 17, at 889 (including prevention of violence in the category of
compelling school interests); Reeves, supra note 66, at 1158 (including “fighting words” as an
example of off-campus speech that is categorically unworthy of First Amendment protection);
Tuneski, supra note 18, at 182-83 (including “true threats” in the category of speech that is
not constitutionally protected).
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Finally, the Supreme Court has read into the First Amendment no
protection for “fighting words,”94 a subset of threatening speech that
can be reasonably generalized in this context to include all threatening student speech.95 The following instances of student speech
would all be subject to regulation under the proposed framework.
1. J.S. ex rel. H.S. v. Bethlehem Area School District
In J.S. ex rel. H.S. v. Bethlehem Area School District, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court upheld punishment of a student who created
a website off campus that listed reasons why his teacher should die,
depicted his teacher with a severed head, and solicited donations for
hiring a hit man to kill his teacher.96 Because the student showed
the website to other students at school, he clearly intended to
guarantee that it reached campus.97 But even without the dissemination of the website at school, this speech could be regulated under
the proposed framework because it was threatening and reasonably
foreshadowed violence.
Critics of this result may argue that the proposed framework
would chill harmless student speech.98 This criticism garners two
responses. First, simply because an instance of speech does not
actually lead to violence does not render it “harmless” by any
definition. The emotional impact on the teacher and her family, the
administrative costs incurred by the school and the authorities, and
the disruption of the school environment are all very real harms
that the proposed framework would have prevented. Second, the
proposed framework would not exist in a vacuum; students, parents,
teachers, and administrators would all be aware of the potential
consequences of threatening student speech. Rather than chill
harmless speech, this awareness would encourage students to be
94. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571-72 (1942) (“[Prevention and
punishment of] certain ... classes of speech ... have never been thought to raise any
Constitutional problem. These include ... ‘fighting’ words—those which by their very utterance
inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace.”).
95. For a discussion of the limits and justifications of this generalization, see notes and
accompanying text infra Part III.C.
96. 807 A.2d 847, 850-51 (Pa. 2002).
97. Id. at 852.
98. Local police and the FBI ultimately declined to file charges against the student. Id.
at 852.
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clearer when creating and disseminating speech that is in fact
harmless but could be misconstrued to be threatening violence. The
website in Bethlehem looked threatening enough to prompt the
school principal to contact authorities and for the authorities to
investigate, so clearly it crossed the line into threatening violence.99
2. Wisniewski ex rel. Wisniewski v. Board of Education of the
Weedsport Central School District
In Wisniewski ex rel. Wisniewski v. Board of Education of the
Weedsport Central School District, the Second Circuit upheld the
suspension of an eighth grader who created a threatening AOL
Instant Messenger (AIM) icon100 entirely from home and sent
messages including the icon to fifteen of his friends over the course
of three weeks.101 The icon depicted a small figure being shot, with
the words “Kill Mr. VanderMolen” beneath it.102 The court held that
administrators could reasonably foresee that the icon would cause
a substantial disruption at school and that the suspension was
justified.103
Under the proposed standard, this speech would have been
deemed off-campus.104 Because the icon was created and disseminated exclusively from the student’s home, a reasonable person
would likely not believe that the student intended to guarantee that
the icon would reach campus. However, this decision was comfortably within the proposed boundaries of threatening speech because
the icon reasonably foreshadowed violence. If the student had not
advocated death or physical harm, but instead had shown a
nonviolent photo of the teacher above the phrase “I hate Mr.
VanderMolen,” for example, the threatening speech exception would
not have applied, and the speech would not have been subject to
regulation under the proposed framework.
99. Id.
100. 494 F.3d 34, 35-36 (2d Cir. 2007). For an explanation of AIM icons generally, see id.
101. Id. at 36.
102. Id. at 35-36. A classmate saw the AIM icon, brought a copy to school, and notified Mr.
VanderMolen, the eighth grader’s English teacher at the time. Id. at 36.
103. Id. at 35.
104. Although the student was advocating an activity, killing his teacher, he was not
necessarily advocating that the activity be done on campus.
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3. LaVine v. Blaine School District
In LaVine v. Blaine School District, the Ninth Circuit upheld the
emergency expulsion of a student who wrote, brought to school, and
shared with some of his friends and his English teacher a poem105
in which the narrator kills twenty-eight people and commits
suicide.106 The court applied Tinker and held that the administration had reasonably predicted a substantial disruption of the school
environment due to the threatening nature of the poem.107
LaVine involved speech that was created for the express purpose
of being disseminated on campus.108 Although the proposed
framework supports the court’s use of Tinker in this situation,
where the student objectively intended to guarantee that his speech
reached school, it is important to understand how the proposed
framework could have led to the same result even if the student had
not brought his poem to school. If, for instance, administrators
found out about the poem through a friend or parent, they would
still have authority to take action under this Note’s proposed
framework.
A student who feels inclined to write a poem like this, who has
consulted his guidance counselor about suicidal inclinations,109 and
who is independently considered a danger to himself and others,110

105. 257 F.3d 981, 983-86 (9th Cir. 2001) (“[E]ntitled ‘Last Words[ ]’ [T]he [poem] reads [I]
pulled my gun, from its case, and began to load it. I remember, thinking at least I won’t, go
alone.... As I approched [sic], the classroom door, I drew my gun and, threw open the door,
Bang, Bang, Bang-Bang. When it all was over, 28 were, dead, and all I remember, was not
felling [sic], any remorce [sic], for I felt, I was, clensing [sic] my soul ... as the bell rang, all I
could here [sic], were screams ... as the students, found their, slayen [sic] classmates, 2 years
have passed, and now I lay, 29 roses, down upon, these stairs, as now, I feel, I may, strike
again. No tears, shall be shead [sic], in sarrow [sic], for I am, alone, and now, I hope, I can
feel, remorce [sic], for what I did, without a shed, of tears, for no tear, shall fall, from your
face, but from mine, as I try, to rest in peace, Bang!”).
106. Id. at 983-84.
107. Id. at 989.
108. Id. at 984 (detailing that the student shared many poems with his previous English
teachers).
109. Id.
110. See id. at 988 (“[He] was not disciplined because of the poem, but was expelled based
upon a confluence of factors, including the poem, that indicated he was a danger to the safety
of the school and to himself.”).
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is a prime candidate for emergency separation to ensure school
safety. That some particular evidence of dangerousness—here, the
poem—is not voluntarily disclosed to the school does not diminish
its foreshadowing of violence. It is probative of a student’s danger to
himself and others that he is contemplating murder and suicide,
even if he does not choose to share that fact with his teacher. If he
shares that fact with another student, who then notifies a teacher
or administrator, administrators are more than justified in taking
protective action.
Additionally, that this particular evidence was a “work of art”
does not diminish the potential danger to the school. Neither the
level of abstraction of the threat nor its use of past tense alters its
status as a threat. If the student had simply written: “I killed
twenty-eight classmates and committed suicide,” there would be
little question that he was threatening himself and others. This is
where the unique judgment of administrators factors into the
proposed framework. Administrators can speak with people familiar
with the student, examine the contents of the potential threat, and
make a judgment for the safety of the school. To assert that this
framework does not contemplate an exception for artwork is merely
to assert that administrators will not have their hands tied because
a particular threat is abstractly worded.
Given the potentially lethal consequences of ignoring threatening
speech, and the administration’s responsibility to protect the school,
all threatening speech that reasonably foreshadows violence is
subject to administrative regulation under the proposed framework.
C. Student Speech About Other Students
Under the proposed framework, off-campus student speech about
other students will be subject to regulation if a reasonable person
would expect it to cause a substantial disruption of targeted
students’ school activities. This standard empowers administrators
to use their judgment because they are uniquely positioned to do so.
To be clear, under this Note’s proposed framework there are many
instances of off-campus student speech about other students that
administrators would not be able to regulate. For instance, if a
student runs a club at school and lists other students as officers on
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the club’s website, administrators have no authority to regulate that
speech because a reasonable person would not expect such a listing
to substantially disrupt the listed students’ school activities.
However, if the same student lists one of his colleagues as “officer
douchebag,” administrators have good reason to investigate, and
possibly get involved; a reasonable person would expect such online
school-related ridicule to substantially disrupt the student-officer’s
school activities. This standard does not require administrators to
monitor all student-managed websites; it merely empowers them to
take action based on that content if the need arises.
As speech about fellow students receives growing attention from
administrators, parents, and lawmakers,111 there is reason to
believe that all parties are interested in the same goals of reducing
student victimization and improving the student educational
experience.112
1. Kowalski v. Berkeley County Schools
A good example of such speech occurred in Kowalski v. Berkeley
County Schools.113 In that case, the Fourth Circuit upheld the
suspension of a student who made a MySpace discussion group that
ridiculed one of her classmates.114 The court applied the second
prong of Tinker, holding that the speech “collid[ed] with the rights
of others.”115 Under the proposed framework, this speech could be
reached as on-campus or as off-campus speech about another
student that could reasonably interfere with her school activity. But
the court held the speech substantially disruptive without addressing whether it was on-campus.116 Consistent with the policy of the
proposed framework, the court upheld regulation of the student’s

111. E.g., Willard, supra note 5, at 80 (“[R]ecently attention to bullying has increased
dramatically.”).
112. See id. at 83-84 (noting that forty-five states have antibullying laws, and 95 percent
of school districts have antibullying policies).
113. 652 F.3d 565, 567-69 (4th Cir. 2011).
114. The student invited approximately one hundred MySpace users to view a web page,
twenty-four of whom were classmates of the targeted student, which discussed a fellow
student who allegedly had herpes. Id. at 567.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 572.
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speech to protect the right of students to be free from ridicule and
harassment.
2. Emmett v. Kent School District No. 415
Despite the broad administrative discretion granted under this
prong, the decision in Emmett v. Kent School District No. 415
illustrates some important limits. In that case, the Western District
of Washington overturned the school’s discipline of a student who
had created a website depicting fake obituaries for two of his
friends.117 Applying Tinker, the court held that the speech was offcampus in nature and not substantially disruptive.118
This speech also would have been protected under the proposed
framework. The speech could not be considered “threatening” speech
because the website did not reasonably foreshadow violence—the
website itself stated that it was not serious.119 In the context of
speech about other students, administrators may be excused for
initially believing—based on sensationalistic journalism120—that the
website would cause a substantial disruption of those students’
school activities. But more diligent research would have confirmed
that was not the case; indeed, administrators ultimately conceded
that their initial punishment was too severe.121
3. J.C. ex rel. R.C. v. Beverly Hills Unified School District
One student speech case does challenge this Note’s proposed
framework. In J.C. ex rel. R.C. v. Beverly Hills Unified School
District,122 the Central District of California overturned the
punishment of a student who posted and publicized a four and onehalf minute YouTube video in which she and her friends describe
117. 92 F. Supp. 2d 1088, 1089-90 (W.D. Wash. 2000).
118. Id.
119. Id. at 1089 (“The web page ... included disclaimers warning a visitor that the site was
not sponsored by the school, and for entertainment purposes only.”).
120. See id. (“[A] television news story characterized Plaintiff’s web site as featuring a ‘hit
list’ of people to be killed, although the words ‘hit list’ appear nowhere on the web site.”).
121. See id. (“The emergency expulsion was subsequently modified to a five-day short term
suspension.”).
122. 711 F. Supp. 2d 1094 (C.D. Cal. 2010).
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another classmate as “a slut,” “spoiled,” and “the ugliest piece of shit
I’ve ever seen in my whole life.”123
This case would have certainly been decided differently under the
proposed framework. This speech was clearly an attack on the
student victim, and a reasonable person would expect such an
attack to cause a substantial disruption of that student’s school
activities. Unlike the prank speech in Emmett, which was intended
“for entertainment purposes only,”124 no permissible use could be
construed by administrators for the hurtful, ridiculing speech in this
case.
Notably, the result in Beverly Hills has been widely criticized.125
In a society where online presence and reputation are steadily
gaining importance, the proposed framework protects students from
victimization by enabling regulation of speech that would reasonably be expected to substantially disrupt their school activities.
D. Student Speech About Teachers
Under the proposed framework, nonthreatening off-campus
speech about teachers will be presumed to be protected from
regulation. Whereas threatening speech or speech about other
students is unlikely to be productive or contribute to the public
discourse, speech about teachers—particularly critical speech—can
lead to an improved learning experience for that teacher’s
students.126 Three main reasons support this framework’s protection
of off-campus student speech about teachers.
First, off-campus student speech may provide a “venting” function
that allows students to express frustrations about their education
in a productive way.127 Second, administrators and teachers, rather
123. Id. at 1098.
124. Emmett, 92 F. Supp. 2d at 1089.
125. Willard, supra note 5, at 102-04 (criticizing the court for lacking “full briefing of the
case law related to a school’s response to student speech that harmfully targets another
student,” and for “discount[ing] the emotional harm inflicted on [the victim]”).
126. See, e.g., Ellen McCulloch-Lovell , As Long as It’s About More than Scores, N.Y.
TIMES (Mar. 14, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2012/09/17/professors-andthe-students-who-grade-them/student-evaluations-work-as-long-as-theyre-about-more-thanscores (“Student voices, when weighed and considered, influence teaching at places where ...
effective teaching is highly valued.”).
127. Calvert, supra note 18, at 282 (discussing the “safety valve” function of speech).
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than students, should be the targets of any necessary student
venting. This added burden on staff and faculty is justified to the
extent that it facilitates education without “collid[ing] with the
rights of other[ ]” students.128 Administrators and teachers are
physically and emotionally mature enough, as well as specially
trained, to withstand necessary student venting.129 Third, a robust
discussion and critique of teachers’ performance can contribute to
the public discourse. In the school context, such discussion could
actually lead to educational improvements. Relevant case law
suggests that courts are already applying such a standard to offcampus speech about teachers.
1. Evans v. Bayer and Fenton v. Stear
Relatively recently, in Evans v. Bayer, the Southern District of
Florida overturned the punishment of a student for creating a
Facebook group called “Ms. Sarah Phelps is the worst teacher I’ve
ever met.”130 The group was dedicated to criticizing the teacher, and
actually led to a discussion wherein other students disagreed with
the student and supported the teacher.131 Expressive discourse like
this is precisely the type of speech that the proposed framework
seeks to protect.
Prior to that decision, the court in Fenton v. Stear agreed with the
result, if not the approach, of the proposed framework.132 In that
case, a student was punished because his off-campus insult to a
teacher was considered to constitute fighting words, and was thus
unprotected under the First Amendment.133 Though reasonable
128. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 512-13 (1969) (citing
Burnside v. Byars, 363 F.2d 744, 749 (5th Cir. 1966)).
129. See, e.g., LESLEY UNIVERSITY, GRADUATE AND ADULT BACCALAUREATE PROGRAM
ACADEMIC CATALOG & HANDBOOK (2012-13), available at http://www.lesley.edu/provost/con
tent/2011_2012_academic_grad_catalog.pdf (detailing various courses and programs of study
that include specific training in classroom management).
130. Evans v. Bayer, 684 F. Supp. 2d 1365, 1367-77 (S.D. Fla. 2010).
131. Id. at 1367 (“The group’s purpose was for students to voice their dislike of the [sic] Ms.
Phelps.... Three postings appeared on the page from other students supporting Ms. Phelps and
debasing Evans for creating the group.”).
132. Fenton v. Stear, 423 F. Supp. 767, 769, 771 (W.D. Pa. 1976) (upholding punishment
for a student who called his teacher a “big prick” off campus, but in public).
133. Id. at 771.
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minds may disagree with the court’s interpretation of the given
insult as fighting words, the result clearly fits within the proposed
framework. Because fighting words, by their definition, reasonably
foreshadow violence,134 they can be regulated as threatening speech
under the proposed framework.
E. Student Speech About Administrators
Like off-campus speech about teachers, off-campus speech about
administrators will be protected under the proposed framework for
three main reasons: (1) students need a safe outlet to vent their
frustrations; (2) administrators and teachers are appropriately
equipped to absorb necessary student venting; and (3) criticism of
administrators and teachers actually can lead to an improved
educational experience.135
The term “administrators” has thus far referred to a number of
parties who represent the school in an administrative capacity. The
following sections will address those parties more specifically.
Section 1 will address athletic personnel and will illustrate why
speech about leaders of voluntary student activities is not protected
under the proposed framework; Section 2 will briefly address school
principals; and Section 3 will clarify an important aspect of the
framework’s on-/off-campus prong by reviewing three cases about
speech regarding administrators and school infrastructure.
1. Voluntary Competition Exception
The issue addressed in Lowery v. Euverard illustrates the limit of
protection for speech about administrators under the proposed
framework. In that case, the Sixth Circuit upheld the removal of
students from a high school football team after they circulated and
signed a petition stating that they hated their coach and did not
want to play for him.136 Unlike other instances of student speech
134. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571-72 (1942) (“‘[F]ighting’ words—those
which by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the
peace.”).
135. See, e.g., McCulloch-Lovell, supra note 126.
136. 497 F.3d 584, 585 (6th Cir. 2007). The students intended to keep the petition secret
from the coach until they gave it to the principal after the season, but the coach found out
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about administrators, this case addressed student speech about the
coach of a voluntary, competitive activity. As the court pointed out:
[S]tudent athletes are subject to more restrictions than the
student body ... due to the differing natures of the classroom and
playing field. One of the purposes of education is to train
students to fulfill their role in a free society. Thus, it is appropriate for students to learn to express and evaluate competing
viewpoints. The goal of an athletic team is much narrower....
[T]he immediate goal of an athletic team is to win the game, and
the coach determines how best to obtain that goal.137

The same is true of other voluntary activities, especially in high
school. A voluntary enterprise that accepts or rejects students based
on their abilities, often for the purpose of competition,138 cannot be
categorically forced to tolerate divisive insubordination. Additionally, consistent with Kuhlmeier, student speech about a coach or
other leader could be perceived as school-subsidized speech.139
Therefore, student speech about leaders of voluntary student
activities is unprotected under the proposed framework.140
The limit to this exception is illustrated by the Western District
of Pennsylvania’s decision in Killion v. Franklin Regional School
District.141 In that case, the court overturned school discipline for a
student who created and e-mailed to several of his classmates a
“Top Ten” list of insults about his school’s athletic director.142 The
speech was decidedly off-campus143 and clearly targeted an adminis-

about the petition in-season. Id. at 585-86.
137. Id. at 589.
138. Some of the many examples of these voluntary enterprises include varsity sports,
theater, and marching band.
139. 484 U.S. 260, 270-71 (1988) (holding that school administrators have greater control
over speech that might “reasonably [be] perceive[d] to bear the imprimatur of the school”).
140. This gap can appropriately be addressed by each school or district individually. A
school policy that defines the limits of a coach or faculty advisor’s power is recommended.
141. 136 F. Supp. 2d 446 (W.D. Pa. 2001).
142. Id. at 448.
143. Id. (“[The student] did not print or copy the list to bring it on school premises because,
after copying and distributing similar lists in the past, he had been warned that he would be
punished if he brought another list to school.”). Thus, a reasonable person would not believe
that the student intended to guarantee that his speech reached campus.
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trator without impacting the authority of the student’s coach.144
Because the athletic director was not leading or coaching the track
team in any way, this speech was no different than a student
complaining about the principal for cutting an activity’s budget or
a teacher for unfair discipline. This speech falls firmly within the
proposed framework’s category for off-campus student speech about
administrators, and it would not be subject to administrative
regulation.
2. School Principals
Unlike leaders of voluntary activities, school principals receive no
protection from nonthreatening student speech under the proposed
framework. In 2011, the Third Circuit decided two very similar
cases regarding student speech about principals on MySpace.com.145
In both cases, students created insulting fake MySpace profiles of
their principals.146 School administrators punished those students
for their profiles,147 and those punishments were overturned by the
court.148
Though neither profile was particularly respectful, nor contributed substantially to the public discourse, the record in Snyder v.
Blue Mountain School District indicates that the MySpace profile
may have served a venting function for that particular student.149
Also, the profile reached the school only because the principal
requested a copy.150 This places the Blue Mountain profile clearly
within the realm of off-campus student speech about an administrator. Under the proposed framework, such speech would be protected.
In Layshock ex rel. Layshock v. Hermitage School District, however,
the student accessed the profile while on campus and intended that
144. Id. (noting that the speech was precipitated by a student parking policy and various
rules and regulations for the track team, of which the student was a member).
145. Layshock ex rel. Layshock v. Hermitage Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 205 (3d Cir. 2011), cert.
denied, 132 S. Ct. 1097 (2012); J.S. ex rel. Snyder v. Blue Mountain Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 915
(3d Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 1097 (2012).
146. Layshock, 650 F.3d at 208-09; Blue Mountain, 650 F.3d at 920.
147. Layshock, 650 F.3d at 209-10; Blue Mountain, 650 F.3d at 920.
148. Layshock, 650 F.3d at 207; Blue Mountain, 650 F.3d at 920.
149. See Blue Mountain, 650 F.3d at 920 (noting that the student had never been
disciplined in school until one month before she created the profile, when she was twice
disciplined for dress code violations by the principal).
150. Id. at 921.
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the speech reach the school.151 This speech can be considered oncampus, and thus subject to the Tinker standard under the proposed
framework. Because the speech did not constitute a substantial
disruption in this particular case, the punishment was
overturned.152
3. Clarifying the On-/Off- Prong Through Speech About
Administrators and School Infrastructure
As noted previously, the proposed framework considers all student
speech that advocates on-campus activity to be on-campus speech,
regardless of where that speech actually takes place.153 It is
essential to remember that this nuance does not automatically leave
unprotected all speech that advocates on-campus activity. By
subjecting such speech to the Tinker test, rather than the object-ofspeech test, this nuance leaves unprotected only that on-campusadvocating speech that could reasonably cause a substantial
disruption of the school environment.
As the cases below demonstrate, this addition is a necessary
corollary of protecting student speech about administrators and
teachers. Without this addition to the on-campus framework, any
student with enough influence to cause a substantial disruption
could undermine administrators with impunity by advocating
disruptive on-campus activity while she was off campus. As long as
she remained off campus at the time of the speech, and did not
intend that her speech reach school, her disruptive speech would be
protected. For example, to regulate a private Facebook message that
advocated vandalizing the school, administrators would need to
decide that the message was intended to reach school grounds—an
interpretation that would strain logic. However, few would disagree
that administrators should have the authority to regulate such
speech, even if the speaker herself did not vandalize the school.154
151. Layshock, 650 F.3d at 209.
152. See id. at 214.
153. See supra notes 81-83 and accompanying text.
154. This Note does not argue that administrators should be allowed to demand Facebook
passwords or other privately disseminated content from students. As in the discussion of
LaVine, this hypothetical merely stipulates that the administration happened to find out
about the speech in question. See supra Part II.B.3. A discussion of the merits of
administrative access to student social media accounts is beyond the scope of this Note.
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In a decision that puts this nuance in context, the Seventh Circuit
upheld punishment of a student who wrote an underground
newspaper article detailing the procedure for hacking into computers at his high school.155 Although the paper was produced off
campus, it was distributed on campus, so the court did not address
the arguments that treated the article as off-campus speech.156
Under the proposed framework, however, this speech could have
been regulated even if it was not distributed on campus. Because
the speech advocated on-campus activity, the article about hacking
would have been considered on-campus speech regardless of where
the speech actually took place. In either scenario, administrators
could reasonably foresee a substantial disruption resulting from the
speech, and they were justified in punishing it.157
More recently, the Second Circuit decided Doninger v. Niehoff.158
The court upheld punishment of a student for sending a mass e-mail
from school computers advocating for local support for a student
event and for subsequently responding to administrators’ negative
reaction to the e-mail that night on her blog.159 The blog post at
issue160 was written and posted while the student was off campus
and was not intentionally brought to the attention of the adminis155. Boucher v. Sch. Bd. of Greenfield, 134 F.3d 821, 829 (7th Cir. 1998).
156. Id. (“Since the article was in fact distributed on campus, however, we need not reach
[the off-campus speech] issue.”).
157. See id. at 828. (“[A] reasonable forecast of disruption is all that would be required of
the Board.... [The article] purports to be a blueprint for the invasion of Greenfield’s computer
system, along with encouragement to do just that. It is a call to action detrimental to the
tangible interests of the school.”).
158. 642 F.3d 334 (2d Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 499 (2011).
159. Id. at 338-42. “Jamfest,” a battle-of-the-bands, was rescheduled against the will of the
Student Council. Several of the students e-mailed a large number of people asking them to
contact the superintendent about keeping the original date and urging them to forward the
message “to as many people as you can.” Id. at 339-40. Accounts of the student and principal
differ as to what next happened, but it is clear that the principal reprimanded the student for
her e-mail. See id. at 340.
160. Id. at 340-41 (“[J]amfest is cancelled due to douchebags in central office. [H]ere is an
email [sic] that we sent out to a ton of people and asked them to forward to everyone in their
address book to help get support for jamfest. [B]asically, because we sent it out, Paula
Schwartz [superintendent] is getting a TON of phone calls and emails [sic] and such. [W]e
have so much support and we really appriciate [sic] it. [H]owever, she got pissed off and
decided to just cancel the whole thing all together.... [H]ere is the letter we sent out to
parents. [letter reproduced in blog] ... And here is a letter my mom sent to Paula and cc’d
Karissa [principal] to get an idea of what to write if you want to write something or call her
to piss her off more. [I’m] down.” [e-mail reproduced in blog]).
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tration.161 However, the post included a copy of an e-mail previously
sent to the administration for the stated purpose of giving “an idea
of what to write if you want to write something or to call [the
superintendent] to piss her off more.”162 Finally, at trial, the student
testified that “[t]he purpose of her blog post[ ] ... was to encourage
more people to contact the administration.”163
Advocating for direct communication with administrators is
considered advocacy for on-campus action under the proposed
framework because that communication, like hacking, can cause a
substantial disruption on campus.164 In this case, the court determined that the speech reasonably could have caused a substantial
disruption at the school, and it was thus subject to regulation.165
Finally, in Beussink v. Woodland R-IV School District, the
Eastern District of Missouri overturned punishment for a high
school student who, entirely off campus, created a website dedicated
to criticizing his school’s teachers, administration, and website.166
Importantly, the site encouraged readers to contact the principal
with their opinions about the school.167
Because the student advocated on-campus action, his speech
would be considered on-campus under the proposed framework. In
fact, his speech was analyzed under the Tinker standard and
deemed not to have caused a substantial disruption.168
Like off-campus speech about teachers, off-campus speech about
administrators can serve venting and public discourse functions.
161. See id. at 340 (“[F]rom her home, Doninger posted a message on her ... blog ... [which
is] a website unaffiliated with [her high school].”).
162. Id. at 340-41.
163. Id. at 341.
164. Additionally, this nuance complements Pike’s “active telepresence” test. See supra
notes 62-64 and accompanying text.
165. Doninger, 642 F.3d at 348 (“The undisputed facts—that Doninger’s blog post directly
pertained to an event at LMHS, that it invited other students to read and respond to it by
contacting school officials, that students did in fact post comments on the post, and that school
administrators eventually became aware of it—demonstrate that it was reasonably
foreseeable that Doninger’s post would reach school property and have disruptive
consequences there.”).
166. 30 F. Supp. 2d 1175, 1177-78 (E.D. Mo. 1998). The student testified that he did not
intend for the site to be accessed from school, there was no evidence that he used school
resources to make the site, and the only reason the site was accessed on campus was because
of another student’s retaliatory act. Id.
167. Id.
168. Id. at 1180.
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Advocacy for on-campus action, including communication with
administrators, is regulated under Tinker to prevent abuse of this
framework’s categorical distinction based on the object of student
speech. Speech about coaches and other administrators of voluntary
activities is unprotected and left to each school or district to regulate
as they see fit.
F. Summary of Proposed Framework
Broadly, the proposed framework regulates student speech
according to which of the following categories it falls into: oncampus speech, threatening off-campus speech, nonthreatening
off-campus speech about other students, and nonthreatening offcampus speech about teachers or administrators.
Student speech is considered on-campus if (1) it actually takes
place on campus; (2) it advocates on-campus action; or (3) a
reasonable person would believe, given the circumstances, that the
student intended to guarantee his speech reached the school.169 If
student speech is deemed on-campus, it may be regulated if it might
reasonably cause substantial disruption of school activities.170
Speech that does not meet the above standard is considered offcampus. Threatening off-campus speech may be regulated if it could
reasonably foreshadow violence.171 Nonthreatening off-campus
speech about other students may be regulated if a reasonable person
would expect it to cause a substantial disruption of the targeted
students’ school activities.172 Nonthreatening off-campus speech
about teachers and administrators is presumed to be protected
unless it falls into one of the aforementioned categories, or is about
a coach or other leader of a voluntary student activity.173
By using these categorical distinctions, the proposed framework
simply, but comprehensively, addresses all forms of off-campus
student speech while conforming to Supreme Court case law.

169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
1998).

See Patrick, supra note 17, at 888.
See Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 514 (1969).
See id. at 508.
See Boucher v. Sch. Bd. of Greenfield, 134 F.3d 821, 828 (7th Cir. 1998).
See Beussink v. Woodland R-IV Sch. Dist., 30 F. Supp. 2d 1175, 1177-78 (E.D. Mo.
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III. CRITICISMS
Some of the more salient potential criticisms of the proposed
approach are addressed below.
A. Too Restrictive of Student Speech
Students are young, the argument goes, they make mistakes, they
speak without thinking, more so than adults, so they should not be
subject to restrictions simply for stating their opinions about fellow
students. Further, school is supposed to prepare these students for
the real world. How will they be prepared if they are insulated from
every off-campus insult?
The difficulty of self-censoring at a young age is a legitimate
concern and is one reason that students are not subject to regulation
for off-campus speech about teachers or administrators. However,
when balancing one student’s difficulty controlling her insults
against another student’s educational experience and mental and
emotional well-being, the calculus is clearly in favor of the latter.
As for preparing students for the real world, there is no question
that harsh words are all-too-present in modern society. However,
three points militate in favor of this proposal. First, students are
exposed to plenty of harsh words by the interactions they have while
on campus. Nothing in this framework proposes to change those
interactions. Second, school officials have the discretion to refrain
from regulating student Internet speech about other students. They
are merely empowered, not required, to regulate under the proposed
framework. Third, students are unlikely to succeed in the real world
if they choose to harass their friends, relatives, and coworkers over
the Internet. This framework will help break the habit of those who
engage in misbehavior before it becomes self-destructive.
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B. Too Much Power to Administrators
Some scholars point out that a low threshold for administrative
action can create a “heckler’s veto” situation.174 How does this
standard protect against popular pressure for improper speech
restriction, and what if the party deciding to restrict the speech is
the party that objects most to it?
First, as a threshold matter, this framework distinguishes
between on- and off-campus speech. Administrators have a high
burden of showing that a reasonable person would believe that the
student speaker intended to guarantee that his speech reached
campus. Only after that burden is met may administrators determine whether a school-wide substantial disruption has occurred or
is reasonably foreseeable as a result of that speech. This prevents
both popular pressure and the individual administrator’s sensibilities from causing improper speech regulation.
Second, administrative discretion is not a blank check for
administrative action. Instead it is a means by which administrators can implement policies already widely agreed upon, like
anticyberbullying.175 As with on-campus speech, the proposed
framework both empowers and checks administrators’ discretion
with each off-campus speech prong. Administrators are expected to
be guided by their judgment and their unique position within the
school, as well as their unique access to pertinent facts. As with
most legal frameworks, however, if administrators abuse their
discretion, courts will function as the check on that abuse.

174. Daniel & Greytak, supra note 54, at 41 & n.176 (describing the heckler’s veto as an
instance wherein potentially disagreeable speech is restricted by a government actor to
prevent third-party objections; if the objectors are sufficiently numerous or forceful, the
government actor will be incentivized to prevent the objectionable speech—hence the hecklers
have a veto).
175. Willard, supra note 5, at 83-84 (noting that thirty-four states have proposals or
amended laws that include cyberbullying regulation).
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C. Threatening Speech and Fighting Words Are Not Necessarily
“True Threats”
As any fan of Twelve Angry Men can attest, there is a significant
difference between threatening speech and true threats.176 Additionally, the Supreme Court has distinguished certain forms of threatening speech from true threats,177 and this framework regulates
speech that may not rise to that level.
Though threatening citizen speech may not be regulated under
the First Amendment unless it rises to the level of a true threat,178
the Supreme Court has held that student speech rights are not
“automatically coextensive with the rights of adults in other
settings.”179 Also, as noted previously, students, parents, and
administrators will know in advance that threatening speech may
be subject to regulation, and they will curtail and clarify their
speech accordingly.180
Additionally, administrators will be expected to exercise their
judgment and discretion when confronted with threatening speech.
Most likely, administration will err on the side of a regulation or
response—like contacting the police. In the same vein, students will
have advance notice and should ensure that their speech is nonthreatening. There is a clear line between insult and threat, and
students will not be punished for off-campus speech about teachers
and administrators unless they cross it.
D. Too Protective of Speech About Teachers and Administrators
Some may argue that school officials should have the power to
regulate speech about teachers and administrators. After all, real
emotional damage can happen to adult teachers and administrators
at the hands of their students, and this framework does nothing to
prevent it. Two important safeguards exist to protect teachers and
176. See REGINALD ROSE, TWELVE ANGRY MEN 43 (1983) (including an exchange wherein
one character says the phrase “I’ll kill you!” but does not actually intend to kill the person he
is addressing).
177. See Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705, 708 (1969) (distinguishing a conditional,
hyperbolic “threat” against the president as not a “true threat”).
178. Id.
179. Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 682 (1986).
180. See discussion supra Part II.B.1.

686

WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 55:649

administrators from such harm. First, under the proposed framework, teachers and administrators may take action against
disruptive student speech that occurs on campus.181 Second, civil
remedies exist outside of the school for off-campus speech that
causes emotional harm.182 To the extent that student speech causes
actual damage without otherwise violating this framework, injured
parties are encouraged to pursue judicial remedies outside the
school context.
CONCLUSION
Off-campus student speech jurisprudence is in disarray. Lacking
guidance, courts distort the framework of Tinker and subsequent
Supreme Court cases to fit the facts before them, or they make up
their own inconsistently applied and highly unpredictable frameworks.
This Note’s proposed framework solves the off-campus student
speech problem by: (1) establishing a clear method to distinguish
between on- and off-campus student speech; (2) providing a
categorical rule to distinguish between protected and unprotected
off-campus speech; and (3) being simple enough to be applied by
busy administrators who lack legal training.
By taking a categorical approach to Tinker and its progeny, the
proposed changes to student speech law will enable students,
parents, teachers, administrators, and courts to enjoy clarity,
consistency, and a better academic environment for all.
Scott Dranoff *

181. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 514 (1969).
182. See Layshock ex rel. Layshock v. Hermitage Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 205, 209 (2011).
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